The Powers of Australian Retail Workers as a Section of the Global Working Class by Karambakhsh, Pooya
 
Global Labour Journal, 2020, 11(2), Page 118 
 
The Powers of Australian Retail Workers as a Section of the 
Global Working Class 
 





The wide application of the power resources approach has shown its strong capabilities in enabling 
strategic labour research that can also benefit activists. Nevertheless, the approach has been 
criticised for ignoring how power is used. This article argues that Steven Lukes’s radical view on 
power can address this issue. His three-dimensional view considers power in direct conflicts, 
agenda setting, and the situations in which an actor’s preferences are shaped by another. A key 
strength of this view is that it can be used to unravel systemic effects and underlying sources of 
conflicts. In this article, the Lukesian framework is applied to the condition of Australian retail 
workers as an example of the precariat. It is argued that retail workers have underestimated powers 
in direct confrontations with employers, and that the legal and institutional frameworks provide 
them with some support. The analysis indicates that capital’s efforts to form preferences, 
theoretical foundations and ways of thinking have contributed to substantially pre-empting retail 
workers’ agency. However, it also shows that there is nothing inevitable about this situation. 
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Power is an essentially contested concept, widely discussed and variously treated in different 
contexts. In recent decades, the power resources approach (PRA) has been developed and widely 
used by labour scholars and activists to analyse the powers of workers. The basic premise of this 
approach is that, within the antagonistic capital–labour relations, workers can defend or advance 
their interests by the collective mobilisation of their resources. The PRA divides workers’ powers 
into general categories of structural/economic, associational, institutional and societal (Schmalz, 
Ludwig and Webster, 2018: 113–116). The PRA can be easily grasped and used, and can enable the 
strategic research needed by labour activists (Gallas, 2018: 348).  
Despite these strengths, the PRA seems to suffer from critical limitations. Gallas (2018: 349) 
argues that the PRA analysis is not truly relational; it only focuses on how power is used and it 
ignores what the power is used for. It thus considers a win to be any strategy that leads to the 
achievement of set goals of a group of workers, irrespective of what it does to the working class as 
a whole. Similarly, Nowak (2018: 353) argues that the PRA can identify the most useful power 
resources but does not explain to what end they can be used.  
In this article, I argue that Steven Lukes’s (2005) radical view on power has the capacity to 
address the PRA’s limitations. This view seeks to provide a broad understanding of power, which 
is theoretically and politically radical and, at the same time, operational and useful for empirically 
assessing hypotheses (Lukes, 2005: 1, 14). To demonstrate its capability, I apply this view to the 
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conditions of Australian retail workers. Although the retail industry is quite broad and the 
conditions of workers vary significantly across sections, the overall picture of the industry 
epitomises contemporary precarious work, particularly that of retail workers in advanced 
economies, with characteristics such as low wages, underemployment, and “flexibility” (Luce, 2013: 
7–9; Coulter, 2014: 1–2; ILO, 2015: 2–4, 10–11; Campbell and Price, 2016: 320–322). I use Lukes’s 
three-dimensional framework to better assess the workers’ seeming powerlessness, reflected in 
their poor working conditions. The analysis shows that this framework not only has the capacity 
to evaluate power in direct conflicts but also to unravel systemic issues underlying and engendering 
those conflicts, and thus to point out the ultimate aims of everyday struggles.  
 
 
Dimensions of Power 
Lukes (2005) distinguishes three views on power as one-, two- and three-dimensional. From the 
one-dimensional, “pluralist”, viewpoint, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957: 202–203). It focuses on decision-making 
behaviours concerning observable conflicts over subjective interests. The two-dimensional, 
“reformist”, view begins with a critique of the first view for misleadingly celebrating the pluralistic 
features of American politics and ignoring as a case of power when A’s efforts are devoted to 
establishing values and institutions that would limit public and political issues to those innocuous 
to A. To address these issues, the second view considers observable (overt or covert) conflicts over 
subjective interests as well as both explicit preferences and implicit grievances (Lukes, 2005: 19, 
22–25). It seeks to identify potential issues that nondecisions prevent from being actual. In this 
view, nondecisions are themselves decisions that suppress challenges to the interests of the 
decision-maker. 
The one- and two-dimensional views of power follow Weber’s methodological individualism, 
in which power is “the probability of individuals realizing their wills despite the resistance of 
others” (Lukes, 2005: 26). Both views exclusively associate power with actual, observable conflict 
and ignore latent conflicts of interest. Thus, neither can properly analyse collective actions by 
groups or reveal “systemic” or organisational effects. Even the two-dimensional view overlooks 
situations in which power relations deny the formation of grievances, for instance through the 
naturalisation of the status quo. In other words, the first two views cannot account for when A 
influences, shapes or determines B’s very wants. For Lukes (2005: 27), “the most effective and 
insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place”. 
To overcome the limitations of the first two views, Lukes’s three-dimensional, “radical”, view 
of power seeks to address not only what the two views include but also what they exclude. To that 
end, it considers decision-making and nondecision-making, issues and potential issues, observable 
(overt or covert) and latent conflicts, and subjective and real interests (Lukes, 2005: 29). The 
differences between the three dimensions of power can be better illustrated by an example. Assume 
that A and B have preferences of a and b, respectively. If A gets B to opt for a, for example by 
using threat, then A is exercising the first dimension of power. If A manages to prevent b from 
becoming an option for consideration, then she is exercising the second dimension. However, if 
she succeeds in shaping B’s preferences in favour of a or in preventing B from developing, 
considering or even thinking about b, then she is exercising the third dimension of power.  
The notion of interests is critical to Lukes’s understanding of power. He argues that the one-
dimensional view considers people’s interests as what they actually want or prefer, while for the 
two-dimensional view the interests can be actual, deflated, submerged or concealed wants and 
preferences. In the three-dimensional view, people’s preferences may be the products of power 
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relations and, hence, their real interests are those preferences that they would have if they had a 
real choice.  
Hay (2002) argues that the third dimension’s dependence on “real” interests entails the idea 
of false consciousness, which, in turn, implies that the dominated is the “dupe” of the powerful 
and incapable of identifying her own interests. Hay (2002: 179) finds this implication “deeply 
condescending”, “logically unsustainable”, “politically offensive” and “implying a privileged 
vantage-point for the enlightened academic”. Lukes (2005: 37, 146–149) argues that there can be 
an empirical basis for identifying real interests where B is relatively autonomous and independent 
of A’s power, for example, through democratic participation. While acknowledging analytical 
challenges associated with the notions of “false consciousness” and “real interests”, he suggests 
those difficulties can become less serious by simply taking “real interests” as a function of 
explanatory framework. For instance, in a “materialist” framework they can mean material interests, 
or in a “rational choice” framework they can indicate individuals’ best interests. Lukes suggests 
viewing real interests as a way to identify “basic” or “central” capabilities, precluded in existing 
arrangements. For him, real interests and false consciousness imply an external standpoint, 
highlight the cognitive power to mislead, and are not the same as the “arrogant” idea of privileged 
access to the truth.  
Associating power with systemic issues and collective will, the radical view has similarities with 
Marxists’ view on power. From such a point of view, Palermo (2016: 6) suggests that the point of 
analysing power is to uncover “systemic effects” and to find “non-observable structures and 
mechanisms” that govern all forms and notions of power. Social coercion stems not from 
individual relations but from class relations. In the same vein, Jessop (2012) considers power 
relations as manifestations of particular configurations of class domination rather than 
interpersonal phenomena that occur at the surface. Power relations are entangled with social 
relations such as social control over resource allocation, the appropriation of surplus value, the 
social division of labour, property relations and economic exploitation. Hence, the role of the state 
is quite central to this view, not only in terms of political power but of class power in general 
(Jessop, 2012: 1, 7). Power, in this sense, is socially structured and works to secure the continuity 
of status quo social relations. As Isaac (1987: 3–4) aptly puts it, “rather than A getting B to do 
something B would not otherwise do, social relations of power typically involve both A and B 
doing what they ordinarily do”.  
Lukes’s view retains an agentic tendency, denoting an account of freedom rather than 
considering power as “a network of boundaries that delimit, for all, the field of what is socially 
possible” (Hayward, 2000: 3–4). Similarly, Nigam (1996) advocates a productive and agentic 
approach to power, viewing it as primarily creative and productive, associated with freedom, action 
and praxis. Although power in collective action requires innumerable free wills to be somehow 
constrained and forged into a collective will, it is distinguished from structures because it is in 
agents’ power to act or not to act. A total structural determinism leaves no place for power (Lukes, 
2005: 57). As the debate between Hayward and Lukes (2008: 10, 17) highlights, the importance of 
power analysis is to identify and devise methods of change. While the agent-centric view may 
overlook “some subset of significant and remediable social constraints on human freedom”, the 
structural view may overlook “particular agents who are responsible for the constraints” in 
question. 
In short, power relations in Lukes’s radical view can be analysed at three levels or dimensions. 
The first dimension involves direct, observable conflicts while the second includes grievances and 
whether they are granted entry into the conflict phase. The third dimension considers the situations 
in which the powerful can shape the preferences of the opponent and thus pre-empt the formation 
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of opposing interests. This three-dimensional view enables assessing power relationships beyond 
successes and defeats in stand-alone campaigns and can turn the focus onto what power is used 
for. In this sense, analyses based on this framework can address the limitations of the power 
resources approach. To demonstrate this capability, this article assesses the powers of Australian 
retail workers. The next section outlines the conditions of these workers and the economic 
characteristics of the industry. 
 
 
The Economic Characteristics of the Australian Retail Trade 
The Australian retail trade is a relevant case for the study of workers’ power because of its deep 
integration within global value chains and its workers epitomising what Standing (2016: 1, 8) labels 
the global precariat. He suggests that with global economic restructuring and the rise of work 
flexibilisation that began in the 1970s, risks and insecurity have been increasingly transferred to 
workers and their families. The neologism combines the “precarious” and the “proletariat” to 
convey the condition of a class-in-the-making, which has yet to become a class-for-itself. (For in-
depth discussions on the notion, see Global Labour Journal, May 2016, Special Issue on the Politics 
of Precarity: Critical Engagements with Guy Standing.) 
Australian retail appears typical of the industry in a core or semi-periphery country in terms 
of employment size (about 10–15 per cent of the national workforce) and low profit margins (Luce, 
2013: 4). With about 1.3 million employees, equivalent to 11 per cent of the national workforce, 
retail is the second-largest industry in Australia (ABS, 2018h). From 2014 to 2017, its average profit 
margin was just under 4.6 per cent, less than half of all industries (11.0 per cent) (ABS, 2018a). The 
low profit margins drive retailers to pursue methods to cut costs. A common practice is to cut 
wages and other indirect costs, such as training, despite the fact that labour costs constitute only 
about 10 per cent of the overheads (Price, Bailey and Pyman, 2014). As a result, retail workers’ 
average wage is the second lowest in the Australian economy. The pressure, however, is not limited 
to their wages. Australian retailers increasingly use casualisation and “low road” employment 
methods (Luce, 2013: 6), providing few or no benefits to employees, deskilling work and operating 
with high employee turnover. In 2010, only 15 per cent of retail workers had been with their 
employer or business for more than ten years, compared with the national average of 24.4 per cent 
(Productivity Commission, 2011: 385). The level of labour turnover varies significantly between 
enterprises but, for instance, Woolworths Group’s (2017: 64) employee turnover in 2017 was 27 
per cent. 
In 2015, 39 of the top 250 global retailers had Australian operations (Deloitte, 2017). The 
majority foreign-owned retailers employed about 46 000 people and earned AU$24.7bn in revenue, 
equivalent to 8.5 per cent of the industry’s AU$291.4bn turnover (Bingham, 2016; ABS, 2017b). 
Meanwhile, Australian retailers are quite active abroad. In 2013, Australian wholesalers and retailers 
employed about 14 000 people in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), and had 
about AU$10bn revenue, equivalent to 3.8 per cent of the industry’s AU$264.7bn turnover (ABS, 
2015, Bingham, 2017).  
The industry is deeply embedded within global supply chains and value networks. The supply 
chains of the top two Australian retailers in 2018, Wesfarmers Limited and Woolworths Limited, 
virtually span the globe, including countries in Asia, Europe, North America, Central America and 
Oceania (Wesfarmers, 2017b, 2018; Woolworths Group 2017, 2018).  
Retail employment has risen significantly over the past decades, increasing from just over 
700 000 in 1985 to more than 1 280 000 in 2018. This growth has been quite volatile, without 
necessarily following the fluctuations of national trends (ABS, 2018h). It also varies among retail 
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sectors. Between 1996 and 2011, employment in department stores fell by 18.5 per cent while it 
rose by 36.7 per cent in supermarkets and grocery stores (Productivity Commission, 2011).  
Retail is the final step of the distribution process, acting as an interface between manufacturers 
or wholesalers and the general public. Despite differences between countries, over the past decades 
the industry has been generally moving towards consolidation and the growth of large retailers. To 
reduce cost and secure growth and profitability, these firms implement new technologies and 
methods. A method that has been widely used in the industry is flexibilisation, keeping the size of 
the workforce to the absolute minimum by “lean” staffing and relying heavily on part-time and 
casual employment (ILO, 2011: 5, 11–12; Luce, 2013: 7, 8). The trend towards flexibility is quite 
noticeable in Australian retail. 
According to the Productivity Commission (2011), the Australian government’s independent 
advisory body on socioeconomic and environmental issues, the retail workforce is youthful with a 
“preference” for part-time employment. The average age of 35 years is only older than that of 
accommodation and food services employees, who are on average 30 years old (ABS, 2019). Those 
who work 29 hours or less per week constitute 23 per cent of the retail workforce compared to 
about 14 per cent of the employees in all industries. The top reasons for choosing part-time work 
in retail are participation in education (44 per cent), caring for children (16 per cent), and a 
preference for part-time work (14 per cent). The paradox here is that although many retail workers 
choose the industry for flexibility, fewer than 35 per cent actually have a say in their start and finish 
times, compared to all industries (42 per cent) or the similar industry, the wholesale trade (46 per 
cent) (Productivity Commission, 2011: 382–385). 
Despite the lack of comprehensive data, the available evidence indicates that the retail 
workforce is quite diverse in terms of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and so on (Wesfarmers, 2017a: 
17; Woolworths Group, 2017: 6). Between 8 per cent and 11 per cent of migrants – born in the 
UK, New Zealand and Asia – work in retail, which is quite similar to the Australian-born and the 
national average (DIBP, 2014: 18). Female workers constitute 52.6 per cent of the retail workforce, 
which is higher than the national average of 46.9 per cent, but the full-time employment is biased 
towards men. Women’s share of full-time employment (42 per cent) is less than their male 
counterparts (58 per cent) (ABS, 2018g). Two-thirds of female retail employees work part-time 
compared to only one-third of male employees.  
The rate of casual employment is also high. As of 2018, casual employees and other workers 
without paid leave entitlement constituted 38 per cent of the retail workforce, 1.5 times the overall 
average of the Australian workforce (ABS, 2018d). Women are again disadvantaged. In 2017, 24 
per cent of male workers were not entitled to paid leave against 34 per cent of female workers 
(ABS, 2018e). Although casuals’ lack of paid leave is somehow compensated by higher hourly rates, 
in the long run this type of employment disadvantages workers. Casual and insecure employment 
can create a barrier for the future of workers. “Once a worker has commenced insecure 
employment, it is difficult to move to secure employment” (ACOSS, 2012). 
On average, retail workers are less educated and have fewer skills than the rest of the 
Australian workforce. According to the Productivity Commission (2011: 381–382), in 2009 about 
60 per cent of retail workers were without a post-school qualification compared to 40 per cent in 
all industries. In retail, about 21 per cent had a diploma and above, and 20 per cent had certificate 
qualifications. In all industries, the proportions were 38 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. The 
Productivity Commission’s report also suggests that retailers are less likely to train their employees. 
In 2009, less than 25 per cent of retail workers had received training in the past year compared to 
more than one-third of employees in all industries. Full-time and permanent staff comprise the 
largest share of those who receive training. However, they are still much less likely to receive 
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training compared to their counterparts in other industries (30 per cent compared to 42 per cent). 
The report suggests that “this could be due to lower skill requirements for the industry” 
(Productivity Commission, 2011: 375). 
Wages in retail are quite low. The median weekly earning is AU$700 and the mean is AU$789, 
which is about 65 per cent of the weekly earnings of an average Australian worker. These figures 
mean that more than half of retail workers earn less than the national minimum wage from their 
main occupation. According to the Fair Work Ombudsman (2019a), the current national minimum 
wage in Australia is AU$19.49 per hour or AU$740.80 per 38-hour week. With a higher share of 
permanent and full-time employment, men earn more than women with a median of AU$895 per 
week against AU$600 (ABS, 2018d).  
Retail workers’ conditions of employment, like other Australian workers, have been regulated 
by the Fair Work Act since 2010 (DEEWR, 2012). The Act established ten National Employment 
Standards (NES) as a new safety net; they outline workers’ minimum employment entitlements 
including working hours, leave, employment termination, flexible work arrangements, consultation, 
dispute-settling and “unlawful terms” (Fair Work Ombudsman, 2019b). The NES cover about 96 
per cent of the private sector, with the public sector being formally under state legislation. The Fair 
Work Act also relies on the awards system, consisting of 122 legal documents (modern awards) 
which define minimum wages and conditions of employment, in addition to NES (Fair Work 
Ombudsman, 2018). These continue to act as benchmarks for the “better off overall test” (the 
BOOT), which ensures enterprise agreements do not reduce the wage and conditions of workers 
below awards.  
Within the framework of the Australian industrial relations system, the wages and working 
conditions of most (69 per cent) retail workers are covered by the awards and collective bargaining. 
This level of coverage has been fairly constant over the past decade and about 10 per cent above 
the national average (Fair Work Commission, 2013: 19; ABS, 2017a). Some researchers, such as 
Price et al. (2014: 755), consider this to be an achievement of the main retail union, the Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association (SDA), which is Australia’s largest trade union with 
more than 210 000 members (SDA, 2018: 1). The union is a member of the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU), the peak body of trade unions in Australia (ACTU, 2018), and the UNI 
Global Union, with several of its members on the executive board of the UNI (UNI, 2018). The 
SDA is also an affiliate of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and several of its previous officials 
have eventually become federal and state Labor politicians (APH 2018a, 2018b).  
A key challenge facing the SDA is retail’s high workforce turnover among workers and 
managers. To tackle this challenge, the union relies on good relationships with employers. It first 
establishes a firm agreement and good relationship with the organisation, and only then begins the 
bargaining process. The SDA’s frame of action is built on patience and persistence and, thus, relies 
on officials’ rather than members’ agency. Through this approach, the SDA has established stable 
and enduring collaborative relationships with major Australian retailers (Price et al., 2014; Bailey et 
al., 2015). The SDA takes a servicing approach, almost never pursues confrontations, shuns 
militancy, avoids media attention and presents the image of a “bargaining union that rarely 
campaigns” (Bailey et al., 2015: 7). Hyman (2001: 10) identifies three ideal types of unionism: 
unions that target the labour “market” and act as interest organisations; those that target the 
“society” and seek to raise workers’ status and advance social justice; and those that act as “schools 
of war” in the class struggle between labour and capital. Viewed from this perspective, the SDA’s 
approach is mainly oriented to market, less to society, and not at all towards class (Price et al., 2014: 
15).  
In short, retail is a large industry in terms of employment, revenue and the spread of supply 
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chains, but it has low profit margins. Considering gender, age, sexuality, ethnicity and even 
nationality, the retail workforce is quite diverse. On average, however, it is mostly female, young, 
part-time, casual and with low wages. Compared to the rest of the Australian labour force, retail 
workers are less skilled. They seem to fit the image of the inevitable losers of the “new economy” 
(Wood, 1995: 49; Castells, 2010: 77), with little power to change their conditions. The next section 
engages with this depiction of powerlessness more critically and offers an evaluation of the 
workers’ powers using Lukes’s radical view.  
 
 
Reassessing Retail Workers’ Power 
To analyse the powers of retail workers, the behavioural tendencies of the one- and two-
dimensional views necessitate a focus on observable conflicts. In this sense, workers’ power 
involves winning conflicts, setting agendas and determining what counts as legitimate conflict. 
Most common, observable conflicts between workers and employers arise over wages and working 
conditions, including hourly rates, casual or permanent status, part-time or full-time employment, 
leave entitlement, the number of weekly working hours for part-time and casual employees, and 
public holidays. Such conflicts are often handled directly between workers/unions and employers 
through negotiations and enterprise bargaining. If they fail to reach an agreement themselves, the 
Australian industrial relations system outlines provisions for state arbitration (DEEWR, 2012: 52). 
Moreover, conflicts can elevate to the political sphere in the form of policy debates, for instance 
over industrial relations or health and safety issues.  
Based on the employment size of the enterprise, conflicts over wages and working conditions 
can arise in two general scenarios. First, conflicts between workers and large retailers are mostly 
facilitated by unions. In such cases, workers are confronted with giant corporations with vast 
resources far beyond theirs. As described above, retail workers are among the poorest wage earners 
in Australia (ABS, 2018c) and many of them are casuals. Their precarious employment leaves them 
unequipped to sustain long periods of industrial action. With less than AU$49m of total equity – 
about 1 per cent of the after-tax profits of Wesfarmers (2017a: 4) and Woolworths Group (2017: 
8) – the SDA (2017a) lacks resources to support major strikes.  
In conflicts between workers and small retailers, unions might have capacity and resources 
superior to that of employers. However, small retailers typically opt to avoid direct confrontation 
or enterprise bargaining and instead rely on the awards system to pay the minimum wage (SDA, 
2017b). Although the significance of small retailers can be negligible individually, collectively they 
comprise a notable section of the industry. Their share of retail value added is 34 per cent and they 
employ about 38 per cent of the industry’s workforce (ASBFEO, 2016). 
Second, despite lacking material resources to directly confront large retailers, workers might 
be able to develop their connections to other actors. Because retail has daily interactions with the 
entire population, strikes at strategic points could create significant and highly visible disruptions. 
Such strikes would involve forces from outside the retail industry. If workers incorporate this tactic 
carefully, those forces might provide the support needed to win their battles.  
Moreover, if workers elaborate their problems and demands in universal terms, appeal to the 
working-class essence of the general public and mobilise the support of consumers, they can also 
consider consumer boycotts as a supportive option. With fierce competition among retailers and 
the centrality of the consumer in contemporary global capitalism, this tool might be effective in 
conflicts with large retailers. Despite severe legislative constraints – for example, the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Office of Parliamentary Counsel, 2017) – it might be possible to mobilise 
the support of workers in other industries, or even other countries. 
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In both scenarios, retail workers can benefit from elevating the issue to the public sphere, 
presenting their case to the wider community and appealing to the working-class essence of 
consumers and other actors. By involving the broader community, retail workers might be able to 
tap into powers and capacities beyond their own. Articulating their grievances and demands in 
more global and universal terms would help to reinforce their alliances, making it easier to mobilise 
support to improve their conditions. The outcomes of the SDA’s participation in the Sydney 
Alliance to protect public holidays (Holgate, 2015) and in the Bangladesh Accord, despite their 
limited ambitions, demonstrate the effectiveness of such strategies (Zajak, 2017). 
The political sphere becomes indispensable if retail workers are to involve other actors. By 
escalating their grievances to the political arena, not only can workers get the attention of the wider 
community, but they can also influence policies related to their employment. Such policies are 
critical to workers’ second dimension of power, as they determine the target of negotiations, 
bargaining or strikes. The low gross value-added of retail, which is about 4.4–4.5 per cent of the 
national economy (ABS, 2018b: 68–69), could pose a challenge in attracting political attention but 
this is compensated for by the industry’s sizeable employment (ABS, 2018f) and its direct 
interaction with the everyday life of all Australian residents. Taking advantage of these features, 
retail workers could grasp the attention of the media, the public and, ultimately, policy-makers.  
In short, there are options for retail workers to exercise their first and second dimensions of 
power, including domestic strikes, consumer boycotts or even solidarity strikes along retail supply 
chains. The persistence of poor conditions for so long could indicate the insufficient use of power 
along these dimensions. However, workers’ disengagement and preference to leave the industry 
instead of fighting to improve the conditions prevent any effective testing of such options. Here, 
the role of the SDA, as the main union in the sector with a high membership density particularly 
in supermarkets, is not negligible. Bailey et al. (2015: 12–13) underline the union’s ideology and the 
Australian institutional context, particularly the single-employer bargaining framework, as key 
reasons why the high membership and collective agreement coverage have not led to better results 
for workers. The union’s ideology is reflected in its strategies that “de-emphasise equity and voice”, 
and thus discourage rank-and-file participation. The result is a low union democracy, which in turn 
could explain why the same conservative national leadership has been in power for the past few 
decades (Price et al., 2014: 753 ,755, 757). The union’s approach seems to be in line with the 
arguments that the problems of contingent labour require “upscaling”, which shifts class-based 
struggles from the industrial to the political arena. This shift means that when the ALP is in 
opposition (18 years out of the last 24 years), union agency is significantly weakened (Bailey et al., 
2015: 12). As is argued below, all these factors are closely related to the third dimension of capital–
labour power relations. 
The assessment of the third dimension of power is more challenging than the first two 
dimensions because it also considers unobservable conflicts and systemic effects. It might, 
however, be traced in its effects on various aspects of workers’ employment. Returning to wages 
and working conditions, the third dimension of power can be seen in how the wages are 
determined, how the debates on these issues are framed and what forms the foundations of 
arguments. Wages and salaries are commonly associated with productivity and skillset. While skill 
scarcity is often cited as the cause of high salaries, low productivity is used to justify low wages. 
For instance, the Business Council of Australia explains wage stagnation based on a lack of growth 
in productivity, promising to increase wages when productivity begins to rise (Greber, 2017).  
Associating wage levels with productivity is fair from the viewpoint of employers, for whom 
labour is just another factor of production, like tools or raw materials. From this perspective, retail 
workers earn less than most other workers because labour productivity is low. As of 2009–2010, 
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labour productivity, measured as value-added per hours worked, was AU$28 compared to AU$55 
for the entire economy (Productivity Commission, 2011: 59–60). If the productivity–wage nexus 
is accepted, it becomes difficult to demand retail wage rises that do not follow productivity 
proportionality.  
The productivity–wage nexus implicitly presumes free markets and exchange. However, 
earning in proportion to productivity is only fair for workers if they freely choose the industry of 
their employment. Based on such assumptions, retail workers would choose this low-paying 
industry because of the level of their skillset, their other commitments or their preference for retail 
work. Assuming there were a variety of industries available for them to choose from, they would 
either be physically or intellectually incapable of gaining the skills for higher-paying jobs, would 
choose not to gain those skills because they had other commitments (such as children or study), or 
simply enjoyed the features of retail work. However, the assumption of free markets and exchange 
can be questioned because it ignores entry barriers and biases based on arbitrary features such as 
gender, sexuality, citizenship status, ethnicity or physical attributes (Dunn, 2010: 19). It also ignores 
the fact that in many regional areas few jobs and types of employment are available to workers. If 
workers cannot relocate to another region with more opportunities – for example, for family 
reasons – then working in the only geographically available option is not a real (free) choice. 
Moreover, the arbitrariness of formal qualifications may pose another barrier to workers in finding 
jobs related to their education or training, hence forcing them to work as unskilled or low-skilled 
labour. This issue is more pronounced with migrant workers, whose qualifications may not be 
officially recognised in the destination country. 
This semi-micro approach – which views workers’ wages as costs to the business and leaves 
them to be determined by labour productivity, the demand for the skills and the return to capital 
– is not the only possible view. An alternative, mainly macro, approach would consider wage 
determination from a national viewpoint and, for instance, link wage rises to economic growth 
(Coorey, 2017). Instead of putting the onus solely on workers, this approach holds the state and all 
the national socioeconomic structures responsible. If workers do not have skills for high-paying 
jobs, there might be factors other than their free will at play, such as poverty, geographic constraints 
or barriers to quality education. Moreover, the low labour productivity in retail, like other service 
industries, is mainly because of its service nature and not necessarily the efficiency in using inputs 
(Productivity Commission, 2011: 59–60). Being a service should not render an industry unnecessary 
nor be the basis for punishing its workers. Connecting wages to the performance of the entire 
economy could be a more equitable option. 
While this type of argument – taking the perspective of the state or the national economy – is 
almost ignored in support of pay rises, it is used to advocate pay cuts. A clarifying example is the 
reduction of the Sunday penalty rates for hospitality and retail workers. Penalty rates are the rates 
that apply to work conducted outside normal working hours, including weekends, public holidays, 
overtime, and late-night or early-morning shifts (Fair Work Ombudsman, 2019c). In 2017, the Fair 
Work Commission ruled in favour of reducing the Sunday and public holiday penalty rates of the 
lowest wage earners in Australia, that is, hospitality and retail workers (ABC, 2017). At the surface, 
it is a simple case of the exercise of the first and the second dimensions of power, in which 
employers won the conflict over wages by changing the rules. However, the fundamentals of the 
arguments put forward in support of this change point to a deeper level of power relations.  
The Productivity Commission (2015: 461, 465) argues that lowering the Sunday penalty rates 
potentially improves productivity, increases the working hours of current workers and raises 
employment. The main beneficiaries of the decision, the report suggests, are consumers. Although 
it concedes that with the fall of Sunday penalty rates some workers will be “much worse off”, it 
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claims that it is the role of the tax and transfer system, and not penalty rates, to support those on 
a low income (Productivity Commission, 2015: 461). This argument employs a macro perspective 
to consider the problem and recognises the role of the tax and transfer system to address inequality 
issues. It implies that the employer has no responsibility to promise a living wage to workers, but 
rather that it is the role of the state to do so by supplementing wages with transfers. In other words, 
this argument shifts the burden from capital to the state. The Commission’s argument also relies 
on what Sklair (2016: 338) names “the Achilles heel of global consumerist capitalism”, that is, 
consumer sovereignty. The argument aims to favour and advance the benefits for consumers. 
However, in doing so, not only does it favour consumers over workers but ignores that retail 
workers are at the same time retail consumers. Undermining the purchasing power of these people 
ultimately undermines the whole argument. 
A year after the verdict, according to the same organisations that pushed for the cuts, lowering 
Sunday penalty rates “failed to create one new job” (Hannan, 2019). The failure could be attributed 
to incorrect or incomplete modelling. However, even if the modelling were sound, it would be one 
among many with potentially different outcomes. For instance, an economic model of the retail 
industry in the United States demonstrates that raising the wages of retail workers leads to 
economic growth and increases productivity (Ruetschlin, 2012). Even more, economic models are 
always, explicitly or implicitly, based on ontological, epistemological and methodological premises 
of some schools of economic thought. The Productivity Commission’s report is based on the 
prevalent, mainstream neoclassical economics.  
This school of economic thought forms the basis of most official economic analysis and 
modelling in Australia and many other countries around the world. Its dominance is a testament 
to the success of capital’s agency and exercise of power over past decades. Neoclassical economics, 
which completely ignores power relations and assumes perfect competition, “the supreme 
optimality of the market” and “the ever-perfect invisible hand” (Shaikh, 2016: 4), does not simply 
seek to analyse the system. It justifies and perpetuates the system. By arguing within this school of 
economic thought, workers and their supporters, consciously or unwittingly, accept and reinforce 
the fundamental premises, which favour capital or, at least, approach problems from the viewpoint 
of capital. In other words, the power of capital rests on, and is indeed reproduced by, the same 
language that workers use to argue against it. 
Other schools of economic thought point towards alternatives. For example, a Marxist 
perspective suggests that evaluating retail workers’ situation requires recognising that all debates, 
conflicts and struggles are ultimately within and based on capitalist relations, including its wage-
labour system. Exploitation and the appropriation of surplus value by the owners of the means of 
production are essential elements of the system.  
A key contributor to the intactness of the pro-capital fundamentals and an obstacle to systemic 
change is the image of powerless labour. It is often propagated by political and ideological motives 
to demobilise workers’ agency (Silver, 2003: 15–16; Dunn, 2004: 178). In many cases, workers’ 
agency, rather than structural features, is the determining factor in resisting the power of capital 
and establishing the rights and benefits of workers. Agency can be critically impacted by the socio-
political discourse of the time. Although discursive formations can be seen as structural features of 
contemporary society, and thus appear as “given”, change is still possible, no matter how deeply 
embedded those features are. A first step to engender such change is to question the objective 
status of such structures and to realise they are the results of human interactions in the past (Bieler 
and Morton, 2001: 26). 
Here, the instance of Australian retail workers is a case in point. As discussed above, the poor 
conditions of retail work lead to a vicious cycle. There is, however, nothing inevitable about the 
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cycle. It is the result of the interaction of social structures and workers’ (lack of) agency. Although 
structures are recurring and relatively durable social relations, they are not eternal and do change 
over time. Retail workers, like other social actors, can contemplate past actions, plan for future 
steps and alter the social structures that affect their conditions. Understandably, they do not have 
full control over all the social structures that condition their employment. Some national and global 
structures cannot be changed by their actions alone. However, they can be altered by the collective 
action of multiple actors and stakeholders at various levels. To do so, retail workers can potentially 
mobilise the support of other workers, including academics, policy-makers, journalists and so on. 
For global structures, they also need to rely on the support of workers in other countries, with 
whom they might be connected via the broad supply chains of the retail industry. 
Of course, this more radical view of power also highlights the limitations of strategies specific 
to retail workers and calls for a class-based, expansive strategy. As long as the fundamentals are 
untouched, the system reproduces itself; the domination of capital continues, and all the conflicts 
over wages and working conditions remain at the surface. Any wins for workers in these struggles 
remain superficial, tentative and temporary. As history has repeatedly shown, such changes can be 
reversed with subsequent shifts in the balance of power. Thus, to engender lasting changes, 
campaigning over day-to-day issues should be coupled with struggles to effect systemic change. 
Efforts to improve workers’ standard of living are indispensable and should not be abandoned. 
However, since capitalist relations of production are the fundamental cause of workers’ conditions, 
those efforts should be aligned with the struggles of the global working class to radically change 




By analysing the powers of Australian retail workers, this article has demonstrated that the three-
dimensional view on power has the capacity not only to assess workers’ power in direct, day-to-
day struggles but also to highlight and assess the systemic causes and effects of those struggles. 
Analysis along the first two dimensions can be used to evaluate workers’ powers in direct 
confrontations and agenda-setting. This type of analysis could significantly benefit from being 
complemented with the power resources approach to clearly evaluate the current situation and to 
devise strategies for future action. Assessing workers’ powers along the third dimension can help 
question the aims of struggles and better place the conflicts in the broader, class-based context.  
From the Lukesian perspective on power, the first dimension confirms that in direct conflicts, 
large retailers have abundant material resources but workers have the capacity to disrupt the 
workflow at critical points or to provoke consumer boycotts. Individual small retailers might be 
more vulnerable to workers’ militancy but usually avoid bargaining and only provide the statutory 
minimum set out by the industrial relations system.  
The industrial relations system and other national and international legislative frameworks set 
the background of the second dimension of workers’ power, determining the topics, scopes and 
scales of negotiations, bargaining and conflicts. While the frameworks that apply to Australian retail 
workers are not pro-labour per se, they still offer potential for improving their conditions. 
Moreover, they are themselves the results of power struggles between workers and employers.  
Assessing the third dimension of power is less straightforward because it concerns latent 
conflicts, real interests, social structures and systemic effects. For retail workers, this dimension is 
related to the interests and preferences of other actors as well as the theoretical and ideological 
foundations of public and policy debates. Some of the key theoretical foundations from which 
these are framed, particularly neoclassical economics, are, at least implicitly, biased towards the 
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interests of capital. Considered as individuals, in terms of their age, education and skills, retail 
workers’ ability to change the balance of power along the third dimension seems quite restricted. 
But viewed in broader social and class terms, considering the retail workforce’s diversity, regular 
contact with the entire population as consumers and their extended connections with millions of 
workers in many other countries, these workers can potentially involve other actors such as 
academics, journalists, activists and public figures to summon support. While detailed strategies 
require assessing particular campaigns and issues, perhaps by employing the PRA as a 
complementary framework, it is clear that the main source of retail workers’ power is that they 
belong to the global working class. By tapping into this source, not only can they form the interests 
and preferences of the wider community but also improve the possibility of winning direct conflicts 
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